



Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint

Author(s): Stephen Darwall

Source: *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Nov., 2004), pp. 43-59

Published by: American Philosophical Association

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3219724>

Accessed: 21-01-2018 16:28 UTC

REFERENCES

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3219724?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<http://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

American Philosophical Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*

RESPECT AND THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT¹

STEPHEN DARWALL
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

I'd like to rethink with you the nature of respect for persons. We'll begin with a video clip that features an underappreciated Michigan ethicist (from Detroit and now Bloomfield Hills): Aretha Franklin. Among the many songs for which Aretha is justly famous, of course, is her 1960s *Respect*, which advances the "give me my proper" view that illustrates the sort of thing I had in mind by "recognition respect" when I first thought about this topic back in the 1970s.² The clip illustrates what I now think is necessary for an improved understanding of respect, namely, the centrality of a second-person standpoint. I will attempt to follow Aretha's lead (yet again) and develop such an account. The clip is from the *Blues Brothers* (set here in Chicago). Jake and Ellwood have just come into a soul food diner on the Southside looking for their former guitar man, Matt "Guitar" Murphy, to get him to go back on the road with the band and the following ensues. [Play your tape or DVD of the *Blues Brothers* here.]

The dignity of persons, Kant tells us, is that "by which" we "exact" respect," that is, claim or, as Kant also says, "demand" it from one another as rational beings (6: 434-35; 553, 557).³ But what is it to demand respect as a person, and what enables us to make this demand? And what is respect for this dignity that it may be thus demanded? In what follows, I shall argue that the key to answering these questions is to grasp the irreducibly second-personal character of both our dignity and the kind of respect that is its appropriate response. The dignity of persons, I shall contend, is the second-personal standing of an equal: the authority to make claims and demands of one another as equal free and rational agents. And respect for this dignity is an acknowledgment of this authority that is itself second-personal. It is always implicitly reciprocal, if only in imagination. As 'respect's' root '*respicere*' suggests, it is a "looking back" that reciprocates a real or imagined second-personal address, even if only from oneself.⁴

My main aim will be to characterize this distinctive form of respect for someone as a person. In the past, I have argued that there are two fundamentally different kinds of respect: *appraisal respect*, a form of esteem, and *recognition respect*, a disposition to regulate conduct toward something by constraints deriving from its nature.⁵ Recognition respect for persons is an instance of the latter. I used to think that

respecting persons in this sense is simply “respect[ing] requirements that are placed on one by the existence of other persons.”⁶ As I mentioned in my introduction, we might think of this as the same idea that Aretha Franklin expressed in her famous 1960s song (taken from Otis Redding), “Respect.” However, I now believe that this thought fails to capture a central aspect of respect, since it fails to appreciate an equally central component of our dignity. I had assumed that the dignity of persons consists in the relevant moral requirements themselves or in some value that comprises or underlies them—that, as Kant puts it, the “nature” of persons “limits all choice (and [so] is an object of respect)” (4: 428; 79).⁷ But this misses the authority to demand or “exact” respect to which Kant refers in the passage I noted at the outset, and this, I shall argue, is an irreducibly second-personal standing for which the appropriate response must also be (at least implicitly) second-personal. If you like, my claim will be that we should supplement the “give me my propers” idea of “Respect” with the view expressed in “Think,” namely, that giving someone her propers involves making oneself accountable to her in second-personal engagement and hearing her remonstrance.

Indeed, my current view is that it is the equal authority to make claims of one another as free and rational at all that is fundamental, and that the requirements on how we may act toward persons are best explained by a form of contractualism that is grounded in this authority. But that is a story for another day. My point will be that the dignity of persons consists, not just in requirements that are rooted in our common nature as free and rational, but also in our equal authority *to require or demand* of one another that we comply with these requirements.

This adds an essential element. There can be requirements *on us* that no one has any standing *to require* of us. We are, I take it, under a requirement of reason not to believe propositions that contradict the logical consequences of known premises. But it is only in certain contexts, say, when you and I are trying to work out what to believe together, that either of us has any standing *to demand* that one another reason logically. Moreover, this theoretical standing is not irreducibly second-personal; it derives from our relation to a further external goal (discovering the truth) or from an epistemic authority that is rooted third-personally. This is a fundamental difference from the requirements that are grounded in the dignity of persons (and, I would argue, from moral requirements more generally). Our dignity as persons essentially includes an irreducibly second-personal authority to demand respect for this very authority and for the requirements compliance with which it gives us the standing to demand. Dignity is not just a set of requirements with respect to persons; it is also the authority or standing *to require* that we comply with these by holding one another to account for doing so.

Rawls gives voice to this point when he says that persons are “self-originating sources of valid claims.”⁸ I believe we should interpret Rawls as saying, not just that certain claims on our conduct derive from the nature of persons, but also that persons have, in their nature, the

authority *to* claim this conduct of one another. As Joel Feinberg put it, it is “the activity of claiming” that “makes for self-respect and respect for others,” and that “gives a sense to the notion of personal dignity.”⁹

These points can also be formulated in the language of responsibility. Our dignity includes our responsibility or accountability *to* each other as equals. We respect one another as equal persons and accord each other this second-personal authority, I’ll argue, when we hold ourselves mutually accountable for complying with demands we make, and have the authority to make, of one another as equal free and rational agents (as, for example, Aretha does in asserting the authority to demand that Matt think about what he is doing to her).

AUTHORITY, CLAIMS, AND SECOND-PERSONAL REASONS

To begin to give these inchoate thoughts more specific shape, I need to introduce several interrelated notions: first, three interconnected ideas, but then a fourth that fills out a circle of interdefinable concepts. One key idea is that of a distinctive form of *authority* that a person or a group can have to make claims or demands. A second is that of a *claim* on or *demand* of someone that such authority enables one to make. And the third is the idea of a distinctive kind of reason for acting, a *second-personal reason* as I will call it, that is always implicit in any such claim or authority. The authority just *is* the standing to make a claim or demand, which simultaneously creates a distinctive reason for compliance along with the standing to *address* it. The relations between these three ideas are then as follows. Making a claim always presupposes the authority to make it and that the duly authorized claim creates a distinctive reason for compliance (a second-personal reason). The relevant authority consists in the standing *to* claim or demand, which creates a reason of this distinctive kind. And a second-personal reason just is one that derives from an authoritative claim or demand.

These three notions bring a fourth in their wake: the idea of responsibility or accountability *to* a person or community. The authority to demand implies, not just a reason for the addressee to comply, but also his being accountable for doing so. Conversely, accountability implies the authority to hold accountable, which implies the authority to claim or demand, which is the standing to address second-personal reasons. So our circle of interdefinable notions actually includes four: authority of this distinctive kind, claim or demand, second-personal reason, and accountability. Each of these four notions implies the other three.

To see the difference between second-personal reasons and other reasons for acting, consider two different ways you might try to convince someone to move her foot from on top of yours. One would be to get her to see, perhaps through sympathy, the badness of your being in pain. Were the other to come to want you to be free of pain, she would see herself as having a reason to move her foot as a way of eliminating this bad state of the world. The reason would appear to be agent-neutral; it would seem to her to exist for anyone in a position to change the bad state.

Alternatively, you might lay a claim or put forward (a purportedly) valid demand. You might say something that asserts or implies your authority to claim or demand that she move her foot and that simultaneously expresses this demand. You might demand this as the person whose foot she is stepping on, or as a member of the moral community, which demands that people not step on one another's feet (and who understand themselves as implicitly making this demand), or as both.¹⁰ Whichever, the reason you would address would be agent-relative rather than agent-neutral. It would be addressed to her as the person *causing* gratuitous pain to another person, something we persons assume we have the authority to demand that persons not do and that we normally understand ourselves, as members of the moral community, as actually demanding of one another.¹¹ The reason would not be addressed to her as someone who is simply in a position to eliminate an agent-neutrally bad state. It would purport to be a reason for her to stop gratuitous pain *she* is causing, not for her to alter the regrettable state of someone's pain or even of someone's causing another pain. If she could stop, say, two others from causing gratuitous pain by the shocking spectacle of keeping her foot firmly planted on yours, this second, claim-based (hence second-personal) reason would not recommend that she do so.

What is important for our purposes is that someone can sensibly accept this second reason for moving her foot, one embodied in your demand, only if she also accepts your authority *to demand* this of her. That is just what it is to accept something *as a valid demand*.¹² And if she accepts that you can demand that she move her foot, she must also accept that you will have grounds for complaint or some other form of accountability-seeking response if she doesn't. Unlike the first reason, this latter is second-personal in the sense that, although the first is conceptually independent of the second-personal address involved in accountability, the second is not. A *second-personal reason* is one whose validity depends on presupposed authority (hence accountability) relations between persons and, therefore, on the possibility of the reason's being *addressed* person-to-person. Reasons addressed or presupposed in orders, requests, claims, reproaches, complaints, demands, promises, contracts, givings of consent, commands, and so on, are all second-personal in this sense. They simply wouldn't exist but for their role in second-personal address. And their second-personal character explains their agent-relativity. Since second-personal reasons always derive from agents' *relations* to one another, they are invariably agent-relative in some way or other; they apply to us from within the network of these relations.

Of course, there might be agent-relative reasons that constrain our conduct toward persons that are not second-personal. We might think of people's feet as something we all have reason to avoid stepping on, without supposing that this has anything to do with anyone's authority to demand this, not even God's. Once, however, we have the idea that there is a reason to forbear stepping on someone's feet in the fact that this is something we can and do reasonably claim or demand of one another, or, equivalently, that we are responsible to one another for this

forbearance (ideas that, I would argue, are implicit in the thought that we wrong someone when we step on her feet), we have the idea of a second-personal reason—a kind of reason that simply wouldn’t have existed but for the possibility of the second-personal address involved in claiming or demanding.

ACCOUNTABILITY, AUTHORITY, AND SECOND-PERSONAL REASONS

Another way into these ideas is to recall Strawson’s famous discussion of “reactive attitudes” in “Freedom and Resentment.” Strawson there criticizes compatibilist consequentialist approaches to moral responsibility on the grounds that they cannot provide a justification of “the right sort...for...practices” of responsibility “as we understand them.”¹³ When we seek to hold people responsible, what matters is not whether punishment is desirable, whether in the individual case or even as a general practice, but whether it is warranted by standards that are internal to what is to hold someone responsible. Strawson argues that attributions of responsibility are mediated by “reactive attitudes,” whether personal attitudes, like resentment, or “generalized analogues” of these, like blame and moral indignation, or, when the object is oneself, feelings of obligation, guilt, compunction, and remorse.¹⁴ Reactive attitudes bring standards of accountability along with them as presuppositions of their very intelligibility.

The important point for our purposes is that reactive attitudes always implicitly address a second-personal claim or demand. (So when Aretha’s resents Matt’s saying “Now listen to me, ...I’m the man and you’re the woman, and I’ll make the decisions concerning my life,” she demands that he listen to her and “think” about what he’s saying and the “consequences of his actions.”) Indeed, it is because reactive attitudes invariably address demands that they are distinctively relevant to freedom of the will. Reactive attitudes presuppose the free agency and understanding of the addressee as what Gary Watson calls “constraints on moral address,” that is, as *intelligibility conditions of addressing a demand*.¹⁵ The thought is not that making a demand is unlikely to be *effective* otherwise. It is rather that reactive attitudes are “forms of communication” that are simply unintelligible *in their own terms* without the presupposition that their addressees can understand what is being said *and* act on this understanding.¹⁶ The point is an Austinian one about the felicity conditions of a speech or quasi-speech act. Even if expressing reactive attitudes to those who lack the requisite capacity, like young children or the insane, causes them to behave desirably, reactive attitudes there “lose their point as forms of moral address.”¹⁷ Effectiveness of address is a matter of Austinian perlocutionary force, whereas the presupposition that addressees have the capacity to recognize and act on second-personal reasons is a condition of its distinctive illocutionary force.¹⁸

Strawson says that the making of moral demands itself consists in “the proneness to [reactive] attitudes.”¹⁹ Here the point is not that moral requirements involve an implicit threat—do this, or you will suffer our anger and resentment or your own guilty feelings. Rather, reactive

attitudes include a second-personal demand quality as part of their very content. When we resent an injury, we feel as though we have warrant to demand its cessation, that, because of this, there is reason for the perpetrator to stop and that he is accountable for doing so. When we feel indignation, it is to us as if someone is to blame for something, as if he is appropriately held responsible for his action in some way. And if the other accepts this address and brings it home empathetically, he implicitly acknowledges an authoritative demand and addresses this same demand to himself in imagination. He sees himself, not just as threatened by a painful consequence by virtue of his conduct; rather, he painfully accepts this consequence as a warranted way of holding him (and himself) responsible for what he has done. (Think here of Matt looking at Aretha, acknowledging her authority to look at him in that “you’d better think about it” way.)

Consider the difference between guilt, which is a reactive attitude, and shame, which need not be.²⁰ To feel guilty is to feel as if one is appropriately blamed and held responsible for something one has done. Guilt feels like the appropriate (second-personal) *response* to blame: an *acknowledgment* of one’s blameworthiness that recognizes both the grounds of blame and, more importantly for us, the *authority* to level it (even if only “to God”). Finally, guilt’s natural expressions are themselves second-personal—confession, apology, making amends, and self-addressed reproach.

Like guilt, shame feels as if one is rightly regarded or seen in a certain way. But here the relevant regard is not second-personal; it is third-personal. One sees oneself as an object of the other’s regard or “gaze”—of her disdain, perhaps, or of her just seeing through one’s public persona to something one is ashamed to have seen. Sartre famously remarked that “I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a *given* object” for the other.²¹ To feel guilt, by contrast, is to see oneself authoritatively addressed *as free*. The “view from guilt,” as we might call it, is incompatible with a purely “objective” view of oneself in Strawson’s sense. One feels that one should *and could* have done what one didn’t do, and feels appropriately blamed for that reason. And whereas guilt’s characteristic expression is second-personal, shame *inhibits* second-personal engagement—one feels like escaping from view.

Shame and guilt both give an imagined other’s regard authority. But the authority shame accords is fundamentally epistemic and third-personal. One sees the other as having standing to *see* one in a certain way (and oneself as correctly thus seen). Guilt, on the other hand, recognizes an irreducibly second-personal practical authority of the sort we noted at the outset. It acknowledges the authority to make a demand, that is, to *address* a second-personal reason for acting.

To hold someone responsible for compliance with moral demands is thus to address him as a person, as a free agent who is apt for second-personal accountability. As Locke says, “person is a Forensick Term” that “belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law.”²² Moreover, to see someone through the lens of a reactive attitude is not simply to

see him as *subject* to demands. It is also, Strawson notes, “to view him as a member of the moral community; only as one who has offended against its demands.”²³ When we hold someone responsible as a person, we also accord him membership in the moral community and thereby acknowledge his authority to make moral demands as a free and rational agent himself. Taking this view home means seeing oneself as subject to demands that we make of one another, and that one makes of oneself, as equal free and rational agents.

APPRAISAL VERSUS RECOGNITION RESPECT

I turn now to the question of what it is to respect someone’s dignity as a person, to respect *her* as an equal moral agent. It will help to begin by distinguishing respect of this kind from the sort of respect that is a species of esteem.

The esteem we call respect—*appraisal respect*—always involves some assessment of conduct or character, at least implicitly.²⁴ Appraisal respect for someone *as a person* is moral esteem: approbation for her as a moral agent. By contrast, the respect we can demand as persons is no form of esteem at all. When we think that even scoundrels have a dignity that entitles them to the due process of respectful forms of accountability, we clearly have something other than merit in mind. The idea is not that presented is an admirable quality: “Granted, he stole hard-working people’s pension funds, but at least he’s a person.” What is in play here is not esteem but *recognition*.

The object of *recognition respect* is not excellence or merit; it is dignity or authority. Recognition respect concerns, not how something is to be evaluated or appraised, but how our *relations* to it are to be *regulated* or *governed*. Broadly speaking, to respect something in this sense is to *give it standing in one’s relations to it*.

Even so, although recognition respect is not itself a form of esteem, it can sometimes be merited or earned.²⁵ An obvious case is respect for epistemic authority. When, for example, one person testifies to something or even just asserts it in serious conversation, he presumes on others’ attention and theoretical reasoning in ways that can be more or less deserved. To be sure, we inevitably accord some such authority whenever we engage in genuine mutual inquiry with one another.²⁶ But this standing is defeasible. If we come to think someone an unreliable witness, we will no longer think he merits our trust and will be less likely, consequently, to be guided by his testimony. Still, disesteem (appraisal disrespect) for his epistemic vices differs from recognition contempt for his epistemic standing. The former shows itself in and partly just is a negative appraisal of him as a cognizer or of his contributions to collaborative inquiry. The latter is manifested in our own epistemic conduct in relation to him, for example, in giving his views little weight or authority in deciding what to believe ourselves.²⁷

Similarly, we have recognition respect for a practical advisor when we give him and his advice standing in deliberating about what to do (or about what to believe there is reason to do). Authority of this kind is on all fours with epistemic authority; it is a standing that is defeasibly

merited. If I come to have reason to believe that someone is not a particularly good judge of practical reasons or that he cannot be trusted to tell me what he really thinks, then I will no longer have any reason to treat his advice with respect. But here again, disesteem for his advising abilities differs from the recognition contempt that might result. The former shows itself in and partly just is a negative appraisal of him as an advisor. The latter manifests itself in how I conduct my own reasoning in relation to him and his advice, giving his views little weight in deciding what to do (or what to believe there is reason to do).

Yet another example is the sort of implicit respect that we noted is often involved in the experience of shame.²⁸ When we feel shame in response to someone's actual view of us, whether disdain or her seeing through our public persona, we feel as if crediting this third-personal regard. So far, however, the authority we implicitly accord (and thus respect) is entirely epistemic (in a sufficiently broad sense), on all fours with that involved in taking advice or testimony seriously. Reactive attitudes differ from shame at just this point. They presuppose and implicitly respect a kind of authority that, unlike epistemic standing, is neither merited nor earned, at least, not directly. In this way, I believe, they express respect for persons as such.

What makes the former kinds of authority structurally similar, but importantly different from that involved in the dignity of persons, is that they concern *non-second-personal reasons*. One can respect the knowledge or wisdom one overhears in another's solitary musings and regulate one's private reasoning by them. Here one respects the other's epistemic authority without *acknowledging* any claim he *makes*, even implicitly. To be sure, the contexts in which we show recognition respect for theoretical knowledge, practical wisdom, and similar forms of authority are often second-personal. Testimony, advice, mutual inquiry, and addressed criticisms all make a kind of claim on an addressee's attention, judgment, or reasoning. But in these cases, the relevant second-personal standing follows directly from a more basic epistemic or epistemic-like authority that is not itself essentially second personal and that can be respected in contexts that don't involve even an imagined claim or demand for respect.

The authority to address second-personal reasons, on the other hand, is fundamentally second-personal. When a sergeant orders her platoon to fall in, for example, her charges normally take it that the reason she *thereby* gives them derives entirely from her authority to address demands to them and their responsibility to comply. This is not a standing, like that of an advisor, that she can acquire simply because of her ability to discern non-second-personal reasons for her troops' conduct.²⁹ That is the point of Hobbes's famous distinction between "command" and "counsel."³⁰ The sergeant's order addresses a reason that would not have existed but for her ability to address it through her demand. Similarly, when you demand that someone move her foot from on top of yours, you presuppose an irreducibly second-personal standing to address this second-personal reason.

This doesn't mean, of course, that a claim to the authority to address demands of a specific sort will not need justifying, or that someone might not come to have some such standing at least partly by virtue of her knowledge or wisdom. The point remains that the standing itself neither is, nor simply follows from, any form of third-personal or epistemic authority. And I maintain that the only way such a second-personal standing can be justified is from within a second-person stand-point, that is, within the circle of four interrelated ideas of claim, accountability, second-personal reason, and the species of authority, related to these, that I introduced at the outset.

So I contend that the dignity of persons involves an authority that is second-personal, all the way down. A consequence of this is that no evaluative or normative proposition can entail this dignity unless it already includes the second-personal element necessary to get us inside the circle of four interdefinable concepts. To be a person just is to have the authority to address demands *as a person to other persons*, and to be addressed by them, within a community of mutually accountable equals. It follows, I believe, that we respect someone as a person when we accord her this second-personal authority, when, that is, we properly relate to her as a person, second-personally.

KANT ON RESPECT

A natural response to this hypothesis might be to object that it gets things backward, that what must surely be basic are constraints on conduct that derive simply from the nature of persons, or from some basic value underlying these, and that we respect persons when we respect these requirements or this value. This used to be my view also, as I said before.³¹ One way of seeing what is wrong with it is to consider Iris Murdoch's criticism of Kant that his ethics tell us, not "to respect...individuals, but to respect the universal reason in their breasts."³² According to Kant as Murdoch interprets him, the object of respect is not an individual person, but rather the fact that she is a person or the value of personality represented in her. It is as though recognition respect were fundamentally for a law that prescribes how we are to act toward persons, rather than for persons *themselves*.

As I now see it, this would be a serious defect in Kant's view if it were true. But although it can seem a natural reading of parts of Kant's text, it actually runs against what Kant says when he turns his attention to respect in *The Critique of Practical Reason* and *The Metaphysics of Morals*. There Kant portrays respect for persons, and its contrary, self-conceit, in second-personal terms, as respectively acknowledging and claiming an authority to make demands.³³ As I interpret him, Kant's idea in these passages is not simply that there is a value represented in, or norms governing our conduct toward, persons that must be respected, but that persons have an authority *themselves* to make demands of one another as equal free and rational persons, and that in respecting this authority we respect *them*. Since the authority is irreducibly second-personal, it can only be acknowledged second-personally, that is, through reciprocally recognizing relations between individual persons.

Kant distinguishes between *reverentia*, by which he invariably means a *feeling* of respect, and *observantia* or “respect in the practical sense,” which he identifies with “the *maxim* of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person” (6: 402; 449). What I wish to call attention to, however, is Kant’s contrast between the way in which respect for the moral law “thwart[s]” and “restricts” *self-love*, on the one hand, but “humiliates” or “strikes down *self-conceit*,” on the other (5: 73; 199).

By “self-love,” Kant means the “natural” “propensity” to take “subjective determining grounds” of the will to have objective normative significance. Like a naïve experient who takes an apparently bent stick in water to be really bent, a naïve agent may take his desire’s object to be a source of reasons, oblivious to peculiarities of the perspective that his desire gives him. So understood, self-love poses no deep threat to morality; it is no more dangerous than the innocent mistakes of perspective that can be corrected once we draw a subjective/objective distinction within our experience and accept some experiences as mere appearances. Self-love needs only to be curbed by the moral law.

Self-conceit, on the other hand, assaults the moral law directly, and so it must be “humiliated.” It is a form of arrogance (*arrogantia*): the presumption that one has a kind of worth or dignity *oneself*, entirely independently of the moral law, through which, Kant says, self-love is made “lawgiving and the unconditional practical principle” (5: 73, 74; 199, 200). This is not just a naïve tendency to mistake seeming normative relevance from one’s own standpoint with objective normative weight. It is the radical idea that something has objective normative significance *because* it is what *one* wills subjectively—first, that one has a unique standing to create reasons independently of and unconstrained by the moral law, but also, second, that one can *address* these reasons and expect compliance. It is, Kant says, “lack of modesty in one’s *claims to be respected* by others...(*arrogantia*)” (emphasis added to “claims to be respected” 6: 462; 579).

Self-conceit is thus a *fantasy about second-personal status*. It is the conceit that one has a standing to make claims and demands on others that others do not have. The idea is not (or at least not simply) that one has a special wisdom, the epistemic authority of one who sees better than others reasons that are there anyway. It is rather the fantasy that one has a unique “law-giving” authority that others don’t have (perhaps because of special wisdom, perhaps not), a capacity to create second-personal reasons by making demands and laying down laws that others are thereby accountable to one for following, with one being accountable to no one. It is as if one were God, the source of all law and accountability (though on most views not even God has *that* authority).³⁴

The moral law cannot therefore simply curtail self-conceit or keep it in its place; it must “strike it down.” It must declare “null and quite unwarranted” any “claims to esteem for oneself that precede accord with the moral law” (5: 73; 199). We should not be thrown off by Kant’s use of the term ‘esteem’ in this passage. He uses it in a similar way when he defines *observantia* or “respect in the practical sense” as “the *maxim*

of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person.” Obviously, in this context, ‘esteem’ must refer to recognition rather than to evaluation of character. Self-conceit is the fantasy that one has an authority to makes claims and demands of others that they do not have to make of one. That is why the moral law must “strike it down.” It must supplant self-conceit’s presumptuous authority to demand recognition of the claims and demands it purports to address.

The moral law replaces the fantasized despotism of self-conceit with the equal dignity of persons.³⁵ In place of an imagined hierarchy, it substitutes the kingdom of ends, the idea that all persons have the same authority to make demands of one another as members of a community of mutually accountable equals. The respect-creating encounter with a “humble common” person, as Kant puts it, gives rise to a response to the *common* dignity that all persons have. This is no form of esteem that a person might deserve through his character or conduct. It is a recognition that any individual can demand simply by virtue of being a person (6: 434-35; 557). Fully to recognize another person’s equal authority to make demands as a person is to hold oneself accountable to him for complying with these. It is to place oneself in a second-personal relationship toward him, rather than simply to take account of any fact, norm, or value that involves him.

Kant divides “duties to others merely as human beings” into duties of love and duties of respect. Unlike duties of love, discharging duties of respect gives rise to no reciprocating obligations. Here we do only what is already “owed” to others (6:448; 568). “No one is wronged if duties of love are neglected; but a failure in the duty of respect infringes upon one’s lawful claim” (6: 464; 581). “Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is *in turn* bound to respect every other” (6: 462; 579). It follows therefore that “recognition [*Annerkennung*] of a *dignity* (*dignitas*) in other human beings, that is, of a worth that has no price,” is something others can “require from me”³⁶ (6: 462; 579).

This means that the duty of respect comprises any specific duty, compliance with which, persons have the authority to demand. Respecting others as equal persons requires that we discharge these duties. But it requires *in addition* that we recognize others’ “legitimate claim” to our doing so, and this we can do only by recognizing their authority *to* claim or demand it. This is what brings in accountability and the second-person stance. In holding that the dignity of persons is that by which we can “demand,” “exact,” or “require” respect from others, that each thereby has a “legitimate claim” to respect, Kant is committed to the idea that the dignity of persons includes a *second-personal* authority to address demands for compliance with the first-order duties of respect. To respect that authority it is insufficient simply to comply with the first-order duties, even for the reason that duty requires it. The second-personal standing to address demands can be acknowledged only second personally, by making ourselves accountable to one another as equal free and rational agents for complying with the relevant first-order requirements. The kingdom of

ends is a community of *mutually accountable* equals—a community in which all have an equal authority.³⁷

RESPECT AS SECOND-PERSONAL

Someone might accept the first-order norms that structure the dignity of persons and regulate himself scrupulously by them, without accepting anyone's authority to demand that he do so. He might even accept these as *mandatory* norms without accepting any claim to his compliance. I hope it is now clear, however, that, although such a person would thereby respect the duties with which persons can demand compliance, he would nonetheless fail to respect their authority to demand his compliance, and so would fail, in an important sense, to respect *them*.

It is, I believe, the connection between human dignity and mutual accountability that explains why recognition respect for persons must involve a relation to the individual person, and not just to certain features of or facts regarding him. Even if one can conform conscientiously to first-order dignity-structuring norms just by "weighing appropriately" the *fact* that someone is a person in deciding how to act toward him, it is impossible thereby to respect *him* as one does when one gives him authority in the second-personal relations that structure mutual accountability: (reciprocally) recognizing his standing to demand, remonstrate, resist, charge, blame, resent, feel indignant, excuse, forgive, and so on. Accountability is, in its nature, second-personal. It is therefore impossible to respect any standing essentially related to it without second-personal acknowledgment.

To see this point from another angle, suppose that among the things we can demand from one another as equal persons is that we treat sentient beings that are not persons, or even the natural environment, in certain ways. Suppose, then, that we are accountable to one another for not desecrating the redwoods. The mandatory norm that lays out this demand would then specify a kind of respect for the redwoods. Nevertheless, without imagining that the redwoods have an authority to make claims on or demands of us themselves, we cannot respect them in the further, second-personal sense that we can respect person. So we cannot accord them this dignity.

When someone uses your foot as his footrest, this is an injury, not just to your foot, but to your *person*. It is a failure to respect your dignity as someone who may not be so treated and who can insist on it. Adam Smith observes that we are apt to resent disrespect for our person as much as or more than physical or other psychic injury. What most "enrages us against the man who injures or insults us," Smith writes, "is the little account which he seems to make of *us*"—"that absurd self-love [and we might add: self-conceit], by which he seems to imagine, that other people *may* be sacrificed at any time, to his convenience."³⁸

It is, however, consistent with the fact that reactive attitudes invariably respond to apparent disrespect that what they seek is *retaliation*, to give as good as we have gotten. On reflection, however, that cannot be right, as Smith himself saw: what our resentment is

“chiefly intent upon,” he writes, “is not so much to make our enemy feel pain in his turn, as...to make him sensible that the person whom he injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner.”³⁹ To the extent that they implicitly address second-personal reasons, reactive attitudes seek to elicit *reverentia*, a *feeling of our dignity*, that is, recognition of the authority we presuppose in addressing them. That is why, as Strawson points out, their expression is itself a form of respect. They presuppose, and express respect for, a dignity that addresser and addressee share as equal persons. (Think, again, of Aretha remonstrating with Matt to “think.” This is a demand for respect, and even though Matt ends up leaving with Jake and Ellwood, he shows respect in acknowledging this demand of Aretha’s and her authority to make it.)

If this is right, reactive attitudes, and the practices of moral accountability they mediate, actually seek the *reverse* of what retaliation is after. Where retaliation returns disrespect for disrespect, holding someone accountable demands respect respectfully. In a community of mutually accountable equals, a realm of ends, it addresses the other in a way that presupposes and reciprocally recognizes the equal dignity, hence mutually accountability, of addresser and addressee.

So here’s the deal. As Aretha tells us: I need you. And you need me. So I’d better think, think, think, what I’m tryin’ to do to you. And you’d better think, think, think what you’re tryin’ to do to me. And if we do that, and hold ourselves mutually accountable for doing that, we’ll give each other “our propers”—a little “R-E-S-P-E-C-T.” And we’ll have “freedom, freedom, freedom.”

Endnotes

1. What follows is the Presidential Address delivered to the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association on April 24, 2004 at the Palmer House in Chicago. Since I began in a somewhat unusual way for a philosophy talk, I need to set the scene. After a short introduction (see below), the lights went off and, from what the sound man assured me was the best sound system in Chicago (and a big video projection screen), came the part of *The Blues Brothers* (Universal, 1980) in which Aretha Franklin sings “Think (You’d Better Think What You’re Doin’ to Me).” (The lyrics follow below.) Do you know it? Jake and Ellwood (Belushi and Aykroyd) come into the diner where Aretha works, looking for her partner, Matt “Guitar” Murphy, to take him back on the road with them as part of their band. Aretha protests, but Matt declares, “I’m the man and you’re the woman, and I’ll make the decisions concerning my life.” In response, Aretha demands that Matt listen to her and “think” about what he’s saying and the “consequences of his actions.” Even if you don’t remember the scene, I hope you’ll get the point of the example. If you want to see it, you can find it on the DVD version of *The Blues Brothers* beginning at 1:02:37 and ending at 1:05:46. Check it out!

Aretha Franklin (“Think”)

“You better think (think)/Think about what you’re tryin’ to do to me
Think (think-think) let your mind go let yourself be free...

“I ain’t no psychiatrist/I ain’t no doctor with degrees
But it don’t take too much I.Q./To see what you’re doin’ to me.

...

“Oh freedom (freedom)/Let’s have some freedom (freedom)

...

“Hey! think about it /You! think about it...

“You need me (need me)/And I need you (don’t cha know)
Without each other/There ain’t nothin’ we two can do.

2. “Two Kinds of Respect,” *Ethics* 88 (1977): 36-49, reprinted in *Ethics and Personality*, John Deigh, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 65-78.
3. Stress added to ‘exact’ and removed from ‘respect’. Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, in Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. by Mary J. Gregor, intro. by Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). References in the text are to pages of this edition and to the canonical *Preussische Akademie* edition.
4. [f. L. *respect-*, ppl. stem of *respicere* to look (back) at, regard, consider, or ad. the frequentative of this, *respectare*. Cf. F. *respecter* (16th c.), Sp. *respe(c)tar*, Pg. *respeitar*, It. *rispettare*.] *The Oxford English Dictionary Online* I am indebted to Peter Railton for impressing on me the relevance of ‘respect’s’ etymology, and to Charles Griswold for further etymological wisdom.
5. “Two Kinds of Respect.”
6. *Ibid.*, 45.
7. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor, in *Practical Philosophy*, 79, Ak. 428.
8. John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” *Journal of Philosophy*, 77 (1980): 546.
9. Joel Feinberg, “The Nature and Value of Rights,” in *Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 155.
10. As I’ll argue presently, if we are morally responsible for not stepping on one another’s feet, then this is something the moral community demands and, hence, something that members of the moral community have, in principle, the authority to demand.
11. This is something *we*, the moral community, demand collectively (in the “first-person plural”). Such a demand is no less second-personal for being first-person-plural, however. A second-person standpoint is always a version of some first-person standpoint (although not all first-person standpoints are second-personal).
12. There are, of course, ways of accepting demands, say out of self-interest in a negotiation, that are different from accepting something as a valid demand.
13. P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” *Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968). This is an instance of a more general phenomenon. There might be practical reasons, say, for someone to believe some proposition, but that doesn’t make that proposition *credible*; it doesn’t warrant belief in its own terms. Likewise, as Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson have pointed out, it is a “moralistic fallacy” to believe that, because it is morally objectionable to be amused by a certain joke, the joke is therefore not funny—(“The Moralistic Fallacy,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 61 (2000): 65-90). See also Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen,

“The Strike of the Demon,” *Ethics*, 114 (2004): 391-423, for a discussion of the general issue. I am indebted here to Julian Darwall and Joe Mendola.

14. “Freedom and Resentment,” 84-5.
15. Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” in F. D. Schoeman, ed., *Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 263, 264. Note also, R. Jay Wallace: “My main contention is that there is an essential connection between the reactive attitudes and a distinctive form of evaluation... that I refer to as holding a person to an expectation (or demand),” *Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 19. Note should also be taken of similar points in Thomas Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 272-290.
16. Watson remarks, as we noted above, that the communicative (second-personal) character of reactive attitudes does not mean that they are “usually communicated; very often, in fact, they are not. Rather the most appropriate and direct expression of resentment is to address the other with a complaint and a demand” (*ibid.*, 265).
17. *Ibid.*
18. J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).
19. “Freedom and Resentment,” 92-93.
20. Strawson lists “the more complicated phenomenon of shame” as reactive, although he doesn’t say why (“Freedom and Resentment,” 86). For the reasons given in the next paragraph, I think this may be a mistake (at least for non-second-personal forms of shame). However, nothing hangs on this for my purposes. If Strawson is right and I am wrong, then either there are second-personal aspects of shame I am not appreciating, or there are not, in which case my claims in this chapter can be interpreted as about reactive attitudes other than shame. Of course, shame can figure in reactive attitudes and emotions without itself being reactive. We say, “you ought to be ashamed” in a reactive vein, but here we mean not just that, were the person to feel shame she would be accurately representing his shameful state, but that *experiencing* shame is a state it would fitting for her to undergo in light of what she has done. In such contexts, shame is functioning as a sanction. Moreover, there is such a thing as *moral* shame, namely shame at one’s conduct or character. But although moral shame is essentially concerned with persons, as objects, it is not reactive in the sense of being characteristically addressed second-personally. I have been helped here by discussion with John Deigh, and by his “Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique,” *Ethics*, 93 (1983): 225-45. For a fascinating discussion of shame that stresses the latter element, see J. David Velleman, “The Genesis of Shame,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 30 (2001): 27-52.
21. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*, trans. by Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1957), 260.
22. John Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (London, 1690, 2nd ed., 1694), Peter H. Nidditch, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 346. For a discussion of the role of accountability in Locke’s view of morality and freedom of the will, see my *The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’: 1640-1740* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 149-75.

23. "Freedom and Resentment," 93.
 24. I take the terms "appraisal respect" and "recognition respect" from my "Two Kinds of Respect."
 25. Obviously, this is not true of the respect we owe to persons as such.
 26. Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Freedom in Belief and Desire," *Journal of Philosophy*, 93 (1996): 430.
 27. However, here is a problem case at the margins of the distinction between recognition and appraisal respect. Just as one can show recognition respect for something or someone in regulating one's beliefs, no less than one's actions, it would seem that one can in regulating one's esteem as well. So why isn't appropriately regulating one's thinking about what *to feel* by a proper appreciation of someone's character an instance of recognition respect? And if it is, then what is the difference between that and the resulting esteem (appraisal respect) for the person's character? Even here, we might want to distinguish the two, but the difference seems little if any in this case. I am indebted to Mark LeBar for suggesting this case.
 28. On this point, see Sarah Buss, "Respect for Persons," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 29 (1999): 517-50.
 29. For a contrary view, see Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
 30. "They who less seriously consider the force of words, do sometimes confound law with counsel... We must fetch the distinction between counsel and law, from the difference between counsel and command. Now COUNSEL is a precept, in which the reason of my obeying it is taken from the thing itself which is advised; but COMMAND is a precept, in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the commander. For it is not properly said, thus I will and thus I command, except the will stand for a reason. Now when obedience is yielded to the laws, not for the thing itself, but by reason of the adviser's will, the law is not a counsel, but a command, and is defined thus: LAW is the command of that person (whether man or court) whose precept contains in it the reason of obedience: as the precepts of God in regard of men, of magistrates in respect of their subjects, and universally of all the powerful in respect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their laws"—Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive*, ch. XIV, sec. 1. (The text is from the revised version of Molesworth's edition available through Past Masters/Intelex (<http://www.nlx.com>). See also Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 25. In my view, failure to observe this distinction infects Joseph Raz's account of authority in *The Morality of Freedom*.
 31. In "Two Kinds of Respect." In his article on "Respect for Persons," in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Thomas E. Hill, Jr. takes a similar view, writing that recognition respect for person is a "disposition to give appropriate weight in one's deliberations to the fact that someone is a person (whether meritorious or not)." —(Edward Craig, General Ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), v. 8, 284).
 32. Iris Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Good," in *Existentialists and Mystics*, Peter Conrad, ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 215. I am indebted for this reference to Carla Bagnoli, "Respect and Loving Attention," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, forthcoming. For a similar point, see Sarah Buss, "Appearing Respectful: The Moral Significance of Manners," *Ethics*, 109 (1999): 797.
-

33. I am very much indebted in this section to Peter Vranas's analysis of Kant on respect in "Respect for Persons: An Epistemic and Pragmatic Investigation," Ph.D. diss. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2001), 25-39. I follow Vranas in many aspects of his analysis, but not all (for example, his tendency to identify *reverentia* with a form of appraisal respect). I have been helped also by Robin Dillon's "Kant on Arrogance and Self-Respect," in Cheshire Calhoun, ed., *Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 191-216, and Bernard Reginster's; "The Moral Distinction of Self-Conceit," presented at the Kantian Ethics Conference, University of San Diego, January 16-18, 2003.
34. "Arrogance (*superbia* and, as this word expresses it, the inclination to be always *on top*) is a kind of *ambition* (*ambitio*) in which we demand that others think little of themselves in comparison with us" (6: 465). For a fascinating discussion of the role of the "wish to be God" in Kant's philosophy generally, see Susan Neiman, *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 57-84. For an insightful account of Kant's ethics that stresses the role of self-conceit, see Allen Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
35. I believe this is also provides a useful framework within which to think of other self-serving ideologies, such as those of race and gender.
36. Note Kant's use of 'Annerkennung' here. This is the term that looms so large in Fichte's discussion in *Foundations of Natural Right*, in which Fichte argues that second-personal acknowledgment commits both parties to recognizing equal rights against one another.
37. See Christine Korsgaard's important article, "Creating the Kingdom of Ends," in *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
38. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (originally published, 1759), A. L. Macfie and D. D. Raphael, eds. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982), 96. Cf. Strawson's remark that in "much of our behaviour the benefit or injury resides mainly or entirely in the manifestation of the attitude itself"—("Freedom and Resentment," 76).
39. *Ibid.*, 95-96. In their introduction, Raphael and Macfie point out that Smith could, in his "Letter to the Editors of the *Edinburgh Review*" of July, 1755, "describe, from his own reading,...Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*" (p. 10).